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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

EDGAR JEFFRIES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20080009-SC

:

SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF
Defendant/Appellant Edgar Jeffries submits this Supplemental Reply Brief
together with the original briefs filed on his behalf on appeal.
ARGUMENT
A. SHEETROCK PACKAGED TO RESEMBLE CRACK COCAINE IS AN
IMITATION SUBSTANCE.
This case concerns two separate acts in the criminal code: the counterfeit provisions in the Controlled Substances Act, and the Imitation Controlled Substances Act. See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-2, 58-37-8 (2007); id at §§ 58-37b-l to -8 (2007). Both acts
criminalize distribution or delivery of a fake substance. The counterfeit provisions make
the offense a felony, and the imitation provisions make it a misdemeanor. Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (identifying felony); UL_ at § 58-37b-4 (identifying misdemeanor).
In addition, the felony provisions define a "[counterfeit" as follows:
(i) any substance or container or labeling of any substance that without
authorization bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint,
number, device, or any likeness of them, of a manufacturer, distributor, or
1

dispenser other than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, distributed,
or dispensed the substance which falsely purports to be a controlled substance
distributed by, any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or
(ii) any substance that is represented to be a controlled substance.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(i). The misdemeanor provisions define an imitation as "a
substance that is not a controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance, and which
by overall dosage unit substantially resembles a specific controlled substance in
appearance, including its color, shape, or size." hL at § 58-37b-2(3).
Jeffries has endeavored to distinguish between the counterfeit and imitation
provisions. He maintains the counterfeit provisions apply to any substance purported to
be from a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser, whether the substance contains false
markings or the like under the first part of the definition (§ 5 8-3 7-2( 1 )(i)(i) (relying on
false branding)), or no markings under the second part of the definition (§ 58-372(l)(i)(ii) (relying on representations)). Also, he maintains the imitation provisions apply
when the substance at issue is not a controlled or counterfeit substance, but is made
specifically to appear as a controlled substance in terms of packaging and dosage unit,
including color, shape, or size. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3). Based on those
distinctions, distribution or delivery of sheetrock made to resemble a $20 dosage unit of
crack cocaine qualifies as an imitation. See icL_ at §§ 58-37b-2(3); 58-37b-4; Carter v.
Univ. of Utah Med. Center, 2006 UT 78, ^ 9, 150 P.3d 467 (stating "'the provision more
specific in application governs over the more general provision'") (citation omitted); (see
also Supp. Br. of Appellant; Br. of Appellant, Arg. A.)
Jeffries's analysis has relied on the rules of statutory construction, including the

2

plain language of the statutes, definitional provisions, and the principle that the legislature has used terms in each provision advisedly. (Br. of Appellant, 6-13 (cites omitted)).
Under the rules of construction, a court will interpret statutes in "'harmony with other
provisions,5" and so that " c no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant
and so that one section will not destroy another.'" (Id., 8 (cites omitted)). In addition,
this Court has relied on the doctrine of ejusdem generis, where a general phrase in a
statutory provision is not construed in its broadest context, but is applied in harmony with
the specific terms preceding it. See Monty v. The Sandy City Recorder. 2005 UT 41, ^
39,122 P.3d 521; Kilpatrickv. Bulloush Abatement Inc.. 2008 UT 82, % 33, 199 P.3d
957 (stating a general term should be given a meaning analogous to the specific terms);
InreOuestarGasCo..

2007 UT 79, \ 54, 175 P.3d 545 (same); (Br. of Appellant, 8-19;

Supp. Br. of Appellant, 5). "Legislatures use this common drafting technique to save the
legislature the time and effort of spelling out every possible situation in which the statute
could apply." State v. Quintana, 748 N.W.2d 447, 456 (Wis. 2008).
Application of the rules of construction supports that the legislature intended a
counterfeit to target those who falsify patented- or pharmaceutical-type drugs (with or
without false markings), and present them as legitimate to lawful consumers and other
users. (See Supp. Br. of Appellant). That interpretation distinguishes a counterfeit from
an imitation. Indeed, an imitation substance "is not a .. . counterfeit controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3). It is not concerned with false patented- or
pharmaceutical-type drugs. Instead, an imitation qualifies as such based on appearance
where it resembles a specific controlled substance. Id/, (Supp. Br. of Appellant, Arg. A.)

3

In its brief, the State acknowledges the dangers of real and counterfeit drugs. (Replacement Br. of Appellee, 11-13). Jeffries does not dispute the dangers. In fact, the
legislature has recognized that counterfeits present real harms to society, and it has
treated counterfeits and controlled substances without distinction. See Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(1) (penalizing conduct for controlled or counterfeit substances equally).
In addition to being dangerous, a counterfeit is a fraud on legitimate manufacturers
and distributors. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(iv) (making it a crime for a
person to possess a "punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed" to make a counterfeit). Also, both controlled and counterfeit substances are subjected to the drug stamp tax
act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-102(1), 59-19-103(1) (2006) (defining "[controlled
substances" under the drug stamp tax act as "real or counterfeit" substances).
On the other hand, sheetrock packaged as cocaine does not qualify as a controlled
or a "counterfeit controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(3) (defining
imitation substance). Nevertheless, its appearance resembles a specific substance and it
is a step in drug trafficking; thus, it is an imitation. Id:, see also State v. HilL 688 P.2d
450, 452 (Utah 1984) (stating that exchanging baking soda for money is distribution of an
imitation substance);1 see also State v. Nelson, 2007 UT App 34, H 12, 157 P.3d 329

1

The State claims Hill is irrelevant because it was decided in 1984. (Replacement
Br. of Appellee, 23-25). At that time, the definition for a counterfeit was contained in a
single provision with two parts. The first part of the definition dealt with substances
bearing unauthorized markings, and the second part dealt with markings and substances
"represented" to be controlled. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(23) (Supp. 1983).
In addition, in 1984 an imitation was defined as a substance represented to be a
controlled substance, or a substance "resembl[ing] a specific controlled substance in
appearance." HilL 688 P.2d at 451. In HilL the Court ruled that baking soda
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(stating defendant's conduct fell within the imitation provisions where he prepared
pesticide in plastic bags to trick narcotics thieves into stealing pesticide, and police
testified the pesticide resembled meth in appearance).2 Indeed, a defendant who
distributes an imitation substance is subject to criminal penalty. See, Utah Code Ann. §§
58-37b-2(2); 58-37b-4 (criminalizing all aspects of trafficking in imitation substances).
Notably, imitation substances - and sheetrock chunks - are not subject to a stamp tax.
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-19-102(1), 59-19-103(1).
While the State has cited to the rules of statutory construction (see Replacement
Br. of Appellee, 6-7), it disregards their application for the counterfeit and imitation
provisions. It seems to claim that the second part of the counterfeit definition may be
construed without regard to other provisions where it is "self-contained," "broad," and
"independent." (See id., 19). Also, it rejects the doctrine of ejusdem generis and claims
it applies only if statutory language is ambiguous or confusing. (Id., 17-18). Yet Utah
law does not support the State's claims. The doctrine of ejusdem generis is a "basic principle" of construction. Mouty, 2005 UT 41, f 39. It takes the plain language of a statute
into consideration, gives credence to the terms the legislature has used, brings general
language in harmony with related specific provisions, and interprets statutory language to
ensure that no other provisions are nullified, destroyed, or rendered superfluous or insignificant. See State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, f 10, 203 P.3d 1000 (identifying the rules of
"sufficiently resembled cocaine" to constitute an imitation substance. IcL at 452. The
case is pertinent for that ruling.
2

The State discounts the relevance of Nelson. (Replacement Br. of Appellee, 2526). Jeffries has replied to the State in his original Reply Brief of Appellant, at 7 n.2.
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construction); Ouestar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, | 54 (interpreting specific and general
language for consistency). Ejusdem generis applies here. (See Supp. Br. of Appellant).
In addition, the State has rejected legislative history. (See Replacement Br. of
Appellee, 17). Yet Jeffries has cited to the history only to support an otherwise proper
concept under the rules of construction: that is, statutory provisions must be construed to
avoid duplication. (See Supp. Br. of Appellant, 7-8); Ariz. Dept. of Revenue v. Action
Marine, Inc., 181 P.3d 188, 190 (Ariz. 2008) (stating statutes must be construed to avoid
interpretations that render provisions duplicative); Mortensen v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co.,
590 N.W.2d 35, 39 (Iowa 1999) (avoiding duplication in statutory interpretation).
Moreover, if this Court determines that it may consider legislative history and
ejusdem generis only if a provision is ambiguous, the State's analysis provides that
ambiguity. The State has interpreted the second part of the counterfeit provision to apply
to "any substance" "described," "presented," or "put forward" through "words or conduct" as a controlled substance. (Replacement Br. of Appellee, 9; see id^, 15 (stating the
second part of the counterfeit definition "reach[es] any other substances trafficked as
controlled substances")). That interpretation would serve to nullify the first definition for
counterfeit, which involves conduct in the form of unauthorized markings from a particular manufacturer, distributor or dispenser.3 See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(i)(i).

3

The State attempts to distinguish between the first and second parts of the
definition for counterfeit by claiming the two parts require the State to present different
amounts of proof. (See Replacement Br. of Appellee, 14-16). That claim is nonsensical.
Both parts of the definition require evidence of (1) the substance and (2) falsity. Under
the first part of the definition, falsity may be established with unauthorized markings and
evidence that the defendant held out the substance as manufactured by another. Under

6
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Appellee, 15 (claiming the counterfeit definition reaches "any" substance trafficked as
controlled)). Thus, in that instance, both the counterfeit and imitation provisions contain
identical elements for the crime of distribution. The elements are as follows: the
defendant (1) knowingly and intentionally4 (2) delivered (3) a counterfeit/imitation
substance as a controlled substance. (See, e.g.. Replacement Br. of Appellee, 32-33).
Notwithstanding the State's broad definition for a counterfeit, it claims the final
element for the counterfeit crime and the imitation crime is distinguishable. (Replacement Br. of Appellee, 33-34). The State claims the counterfeit provisions require proof
that "the substance was 'represented to be' a controlled substance," while the "imitation
controlled substance crime does not." (Id., 33). That assertion is irrelevant in light of the
State's argument for broad application of the counterfeit provisions. (See id., 9).
Specifically, if a substance is packaged to "resemble[] a specific controlled substance,"
4

The State asserts that recklessness is a proper mental state for distribution of an
imitation substance, and it cites to general language at Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (West
2004). (Replacement Br. of Appellee, 33 n.3). Yet the imitation provisions specifically
define the term "[distribute" to mean "actual, constructive, or attempted" delivery. Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37b-2(2). Under Utah law, actual, constructive, or attempted conduct
involves intentional and knowing conduct. (Supp. Br. of Appellant, 11-12). Thus, recklessness is not a proper mental state here. Indeed, the specific provision contained in the
Imitation Controlled Substances Act "'governs over the more general'" provision set
forth at § 76-2-102. See Carter, 2006 UT 78, | 9 (specific governs over general).
In addition, the Imitation Controlled Substances Act should be read to avoid
unconstitutional applications. See, e.g.. Village of Hoffman v. Fliyside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 506 (1982) (construing an ordinance that makes it "unlawful for any
person" to sell items "designed or marketed for" illegal drugs without a license); id_ at
500-02 (ruling the ordinance is not vague; and construing the "designed . . . for" language
to involve the principle intent of the designer, and the "marketed for" language to require
"scienter" and to "describe^ a retailer's intentional" and deliberate conduct). In that
regard, a person manufacturing or distributing a bag of flour that looks like cocaine is not
guilty of a crime unless she intends the flour to be passed off as cocaine. Only then is the
conduct a step in drug trafficking.
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Elsewhere in its brief, the State has made reference to a =.. :U :-; y or "hierarchy" of
ciimes - including rape, object rape, and sodomy - where the legislature has specifically
defined the elements for those crimes, and then has enacted a separate offense (i.e., unlawful sexual activity with a minor), which applies "under circumstances not amounting
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our system of law." State v. Bryan. 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985); State v. Shondel 453
P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969).
Finally, the State claims this Court should not consider Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-3 7b3 in its analysis. (Replacement Br. of Appellee, 35-36). Section 58-37b-3 states that "[i]f
the appearance of the dosage unit" is not sufficient to support that a substance is an imitation, the fact finder should consider several factors, including statements, labels, evasive
tactics, prior convictions and the proximity of the substance to controlled drugs. See
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-3 (connecting the "factors" with the term "and"); Melamed v.
City of Lorn BeacK 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 729, 735 (Cal. App. 1993) (stating "the word 'and5
connotes a conjunctive meaning"). This Court may resolve the issue here as set forth in
the Supplemental Brief of Appellant, and without reference to the factors in § 58-37b-3.
CONCLUSION
Jeffries respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the
felony charge and remand for further proceedings under the misdemeanor provisions.
SUBMITTED this

^ ^

day of

(^\CUj

, 2009.

Linda M. Jones ^
Wesley Howard

SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

to" rape, object rape, or sodomy. (Replacement Br. of Appellee, 27 (citing Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-5-401 to -413)). The State's references identify the importance of defining
crimes so they are distinguishable. That is, the first set of crimes must be sufficiently
defined so that a person is on notice as to when the circumstances do not amount to rape,
object rape, or sodomy for a charge of unlawful sexual activity with a minor.
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